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陳破空在牛津大學发表演讲、出场辩论

陳破空在牛津大學发表演讲、出场辩论

2017年6月1日,天安门事件28周年前夕,英国牛津大学举办辩论会,特邀旅美中国异见作家、前八九民主运动领袖陈破空出席,发表演讲,并参加辩论。

辩论主题:是否欢迎中国的海外影响力?为时三小时,全程英文。

出场这次辩论会的正方,包括:世界和平基金会荣誉总裁、哈佛大学教授 Robert Rotberg,伦敦商学院教授、经济学家  Linda Yueh,美国外交杂志执行长(CEO) David Rothkopf,牛津大学学生代表:Shivani Ananth。

出场这次辩论会的反方,包括:旅美中国异见作家、前八九民主运动领袖  陳破空 Pokong Chen,英国上议院议员、英国自由民主党发言人 Baroness Falkner,牛津大学学生代表 Bryan O'Brien 和 Brian Wong。

辩论会的主办方是富有历史盛名的牛津论坛(Oxford Union)。该论坛以邀请世界范围内的名人或具有影响力的人士发表演讲或参加辩论而著称。受邀的主要对象,包括各国总统、政要、诺贝尔和平奖得主、富有建树的活动家、作家、学者、专业人士、新闻人物等。

辩论会的主要观众是牛津大学的在校学生、Oxford Union的会员,用抽签方式获得进场资格。辩论采用传统英国议会式程序。仪式、着装和时间控制,以及正反方进出门径,都有严格要求。出场辩论的正、反方人士,交叉发表演讲,阐述自己的观点,罗列事实。观众可以中途或随时打断演讲人或辩论方,径直提问或反诘。现场气氛显得热烈而激情、激烈而火爆。

以下是陈破空演讲音频:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hf4UiPBptVI

以及相关讯息
https://www.oxford-union.org/term_events/china_debate
http://oxfordstudent.com/2017/04 ... s-hilary-2017-line/

附件是英文稿和中文稿全文。
演讲和辩论视频将由Oxford Union发布。


旅美中國異見作家陳破空在英國牛津大學的演講

新兴超级大国,负面的全球影响力

陈破空
女士们,先生们,大家好!

我很高兴接受牛津大学的邀请,参与今晚的演讲和辩论。

大家都在谈论中国在世界范围内日益扩张的影响力。我必须说明,北京追求世界影
响力的动机,并非基于全球利益,相反,乃是出于中共的私利,尤其是北京红色权
贵集团的私利。

今年3月29日,就在美国总统唐纳德川普即将与中国国家主席习近平在佛罗里达州海湖庄园会面的一周前,川普女婿所属的库什纳家族忽然终止了与中国安邦公司
的一笔大交易。安邦公司的董事长是前中国领导人邓小平的外孙女婿。

安邦公司投资库什纳家族旗舰大厦(纽约第五大道666号)的计划,早在2016年美国总统大选期间就在进行,川普当选总统后,吴小晖加快了谈判步伐。如果这笔
高达67亿美元的生意达成,库什纳家族将获得如下好处:

库什纳家族投资7.5亿美元,就能换取72亿美元项目的20%股份;库什纳家族出资5000万美元,就能清偿此前2.5亿美元的债务;另外,库什纳家族还将从这笔交易中获得4亿美元的套现。这笔巨额现金,实际就是吴小晖和安邦公司白白送给库什纳家族的一个大红包。

很明显,这是一桩不对称、不公平、一边倒的交易。吴小晖和安邦公司甘愿吃亏,那是因为,他们要占便宜。中国有俗话:“吃小亏占大便宜。”或,“放长线钓大鱼。”吴小晖瞄准的,不是库什纳本人,还有川普总统,试图通过库什纳这条暗线
,影响川普总统的中国政策。(据传,去年12月,候任总统期间,川普打破陈规,与台湾总统蔡英文通电话。中国政府就是通过吴小晖-库什纳这条关系连线,向川普表达了不满。)

在一次与库什纳父亲的谈判结束之后,吴小晖掩饰不住心头的狂喜,用英文向在场
的人大喊一声:“I love you!”(我爱你们!)

美国媒体不断质疑川普家族与外国公司之间可能存在的利益冲突,最终迫使库什纳
家族放弃与安邦公司的交易。这桩流产的交易,从一个侧面,揭示了中国公司投资海外的目的,不仅仅有经济目的,还有北京的政治目的和国际战略布局。

2014年,安邦公司以19.5亿美元的高价,买下纽约著名的地标建筑—华尔道夫酒店。这家原本是美国总统和各国首脑、政要经常下榻的酒店,被中国安邦公司收购
后,美国总统及大多数国家政要都不再光顾,显然是出于安全考量,比如,担心遭窃听。

近些年,中国公司掀起了在海外、主要在西方国家的收购潮。参与海外收购的中国公司,无论是以国营企业还是私人企业的面目出现,大都呈现一个共同特点,那就是,红色权贵背景。比如:

安邦公司(安邦保险集团股份有限公司),除了其董事长是已故中国领导人邓小平的外孙女婿吴小晖,曾任该公司股东或董事的,还包括,已故解放军元帅陈毅之子
陈小鲁、前总理朱镕基之子朱云来。

万达集团,董事长王健林,本身是“红二代”,其父亲曾参加毛泽东领导的共产主
义革命。阿里巴巴集团,董事局主席马云,原是平民出身,然而,当他的公司逐渐
做大之后,同万达一样,卷进了大批红色权贵,先后有二十多名前任和现任政治局
常委的子女或亲属,成为万达或阿里巴巴的投资人或股东。

中国公司在海外大举收购的目标,瞄准西方的名牌公司和高端企业,意在买断西方公司的创新技术,并把技术和生产线转移到中国,在当地留下空壳公司。在欧洲,中国公司主要地先是瞄准英国、后来又瞄准德国,大量收购。

然而,这些收购行为,却是在不对称和不公平的条件下进行:中国公司可以完整地收购西方公司,而西方公司却不能完整地收购中国公司。在中国的准入限制下,外资入股比例通常被限制在50%以下,不少行业甚至限制外资进入,尤其对有政府背景的企业,中国公司可以向西方公司发出收购要求,但西方公司却不被允许向同类中国公司发出收购要求。






足以令西方国家担忧的,还有,中国公司海外收购的目的与动机。中国公司似乎有意瞄准攸关西方国家科技、经济、政治和安全命脉的企业或项目。随着西方各国对中国公司收购动机的怀疑加深,中资收购失败的案例,越来越多。包括吴小晖、王健林、马云等人旗下的中国公司收购案,都经历越来越多的阻力和挫败。

2016年初,安邦公司试图以140亿美元收购喜达屋(Starwood)连锁酒店,因不能提供其股权结构和融资细节而以失败告终。2016年底,中国宏芯投资基金公司试图收购德国半导体设备制造商爱思强(Aixtron),因美国情报部门的警告,被德国政府叫停。2017年,马云属下的蚂蚁金服公司试图收购美国金融公司MoneyGram,美国众议院两名议员呼吁美国政府外商投资委员会彻底调查,他们担心,这起收购,可能导致外国政府控制美国的关键金融基础设施。
近二十年里,中国大举投资非洲,瞄准非洲矿产和能源。每年投资非洲数十亿美元
;从2000至2011年的10年间,共投资750亿美元;为同期日本投资非洲的7倍。迄今,100万中国人活动在非洲。2016年,中非贸易总额达1491亿美元(其中,中国对非洲出口922亿美元,自非洲进口569亿美元。非洲对中国贸易逆差达353亿美元。)中非贸易增长,然而,非洲人对中国人的反感,也与日俱增。

非洲人抱怨中国公司:低工资,恶劣的劳动条件,劣质产品,豆腐渣工程,以及环境污染。中国在非洲的开采活动,经常遭到当地民众的抗议;中国公司与当地工人经常爆发冲突。

中国投资非洲,以“没有附加条件”为名,但世界银行等国际机构指出,北京的做法,抵消了国际社会对非洲以经贸促政改、以经援换人权的努力。中国不仅对非洲国家政府腐败、滥用权力和践踏人权的劣跡视若无睹,而且将腐败与独裁的“中国模式”向非洲推广,企图让非洲“中国化”。

声称“没有附加条件”,但中国投资非洲,却附有另类条件:非洲国家因中国投资所获的利润,必须花在中国修建的基础设施和进购中国商品上。中国公司投资非洲的同时,常常从中国采购原料、征聘中国劳工,将越来越多的当地人排除在外。与其说是援助非洲,不如说是掠夺非洲。中国因而被封为“新殖民主义者”。

上个月,《纽约时报》发表文章,题为“中国需要吃鱼,所以非洲挨饿。”根据这篇报道,当中国海域遭到过度捞捕之后,中国政府鼓励中国渔民远航到其他国家的海域捞捕。中国政府为中国渔民建造了2600艘大型渔船,是美国渔船的10倍。中国渔船一个星期里的捞捕量,就相当于塞内加尔渔船一年内的捞捕量,造成西非直接经济损失达20亿美元。中国渔船的狂捞滥捕,正把海洋鱼类推向灭种的边缘。中国政府关切的,只是其国内需求和政权安稳,对世界海洋的健康、以及依赖于这些海洋而生存的国家漠不关心。

事实上,非洲人把中国人比喻成是大批孳生的寄生虫,而不是投资者。赞比亚前总统迈克尔萨塔(Michael
Sata),曾在2007年竞选总统时说过一番话,具有代表性:“我们要让中国人走开,让从前的殖民者回来,虽然他们也曾剥削我们的资源,但至少他们会很好地照顾我们,他们兴建学校、教我们语言、还带给我们英国文明。西方殖民主义者还有人类的面目,中国人却只会剥削我们。”
从2010年开始,包括赞比亚、安哥拉、加蓬、乍得等国在内,越来越多的非洲国家对中国说不,拒绝新的合同、终止现有合同、收回开发项目。显示,中国在非洲不受欢迎。

随着财富剧增,财大气粗的中国政府,牵头成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行(简称亚投行)。然而,作为世界第一大经济体的美国和第三大经济体的日本,并没有加入。日本方面曾经询问中国方面:如何避免亚投行可能出现的腐败现象?以及如何规避债务违约风险?中方的态度是不予回答。这成为日本不加入亚投行的原因
之一。

与亚投行对应的,是北京极具野心的“一带一路”战略,涵盖从中国出发、延伸到
世界各地的海上和陆上经贸路径。上个月,在北京举行的“一带一路”峰会上,欧
洲国家拒绝签署会议公报,他们批评说,会议公报没有表达欧洲国家对采购透明度
、以及保障社会和环境标准的关切,他们认为,所谓“一带一路”,只会让中国的
出口商受益。

“一带一路”这个名词,表面上,使用了7世纪中国“丝绸之路”的概念,但那时候的“丝绸之路”,是民间自发形成的国际商业通道。如今的“一带一路,所谓“
新丝绸之路”,却贯穿中国政府的两大政治与经济目的:其一,对外转移中国的过
剩产能,转嫁中国经济衰退的危机和风险。其二,以经济援助和经济开发为名,控
制沿线国家,推行中国式霸权主义,借机建立以中国为中心的世界经济网络。

“一带一路”的第一个项目,是在巴基斯坦建立大型水力发电站。优先发展所谓“
中巴经济走廊”。这样的安排,正好显露北京的用心:除北朝鲜之外,巴基斯坦几
乎是中国的唯一盟国,所谓“全天候朋友”。北京发出的信号是,它会优先投资听
命于中国的国家。反过来说,那就是,如果反对中国,就得不到好处。

今年,中国政府实施外汇管制,限制资金流出,但矛盾的却是,“一带一路”却成了中国资金大幅流出的又一大渠道。很显然,不少中国官员利用“一带一路”的名义,报立项目,正好将他们的贪腐所得转出海外,变相洗钱。

在南中国海,北京声称,这片海域的80%都是中国领海,中国的所谓领海线(九段线),贴近越南、菲律宾等国的家门口划了一圈,连专属经济区都不给邻国留下。北京的理由,或许因为,南中国海这个名词,有“中国”二字。依照这样的逻辑,墨西哥可以宣称墨西哥湾的80%海域都属于墨西哥;印度可以宣称,印度洋的80%海域都属于印度。

中国占据菲律宾经济专属区内的多个岛屿,违背了中国签署的《联合国海洋法公约
》,根据这份公约,北京承认各国拥有200海里专属经济区。在南中国海建造七个人造岛并军事化,违背了2002年中国与东盟各国达成的《南海各方行为宣言》,在那份宣言里,北京承诺,任何一方都不得采取单方面行动去改变南中国海现状。去年,国际仲裁法庭全盘否定了中国在南中国还的主权声索。

在北朝鲜核威胁的问题上,作为联合国安理会常任理事国的中国,长期不遵守联合国决议,即便中国参与起草相关制裁决议、投票支持相关制裁决议,但中国与北朝鲜的贸易并不受到影响。就在去年,北朝鲜先后实施了两次核试爆,中国对北朝鲜的贸易和援助不仅没有减少、反而增加。多家中国公司(比如鸿祥公司),甚至长期向北朝鲜提供核元件和核材料,暗中支持平壤的核计划。直到今年初,在川普政府的强大压力下,为了挽救岌岌可危的中美关系,习近平当局才开始勉强执行联合国决议,暂停了对北朝鲜的煤炭进口。习近平似乎开始默认川普对作恶多端的北朝鲜独裁者金正恩采取强硬姿态。

谈到经济发展,中国官员常常自豪地炫耀说:“中国只用了三十多年时间,就走过了西方国家几百年的道路。”但这是怎么来的?剽窃,网络攻击,大规模盗版知识产权。这些,不仅仅是中国个人或企业行为,更多的,是中国政府和中国军方的行为。

综上所述,作为一个新兴的超级大国、世界第二大经济体,中国在海外的影响力与日俱增。然而,其手段、过程与结果,都证明,这种影响力的主要方面,与其说是建设性的,不如说是破坏性的;与其说是为世界和平做贡献,不如说是为世界和平带来危害和风险。

如果这个世界需要中国,如果有人欢迎中国的海外影响力,那么,就须等到中国民主化之后。只有一个民主中国,才能带给世界正面的影响力,以及,和平与安全。

谢谢,谢谢大家!

在英国牛津大学的演讲(演讲为英文,此为中文稿全文。)

2017年6月1日

Chen Poknog’s Speech at University of Oxford

A New Superpower’s Negative Impact Overseas
Chen Pokong

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen,

It is my honor to be here tonight to join this debate.

While China exerts influence beyond its borders, I do not believe that China is interested in benefiting the world, but instead in China’s own self-interest, especially that of the Red Elite.

On March 29, one week before US President Donald Trump was scheduled to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago, the family of Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, suddenly terminated a major business deal with China’s Anbang Insurance Group. The chairman of the board of Anbang is Wu Xiaohui, who is married to the granddaughter of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.

Anbang planned to invest in the flagship office tower owned by the Kuschner family (located at 666 5th Avenue, New York City), a deal that had been launched during the presidential campaign in 2016. After Trump was elected president, Wu Xiaohui stepped up the pace of the negotiations. If this US$6.7 billion deal had gone through, the Kushner family would have gained the following benefits:

The Kushner family would only have to pay US$750 million for a 20% stake in a $7.2 billion project; the Kushner family would put up only $50 million to pay off $250 million in debt; furthermore, the deal would allow the Kushner family to cash out of their investment with a profit of $400 million. This massive lump of cash was basically a gift from Wu Xiaohui and Anbang to the Kushner family.

This was clearly an unequal, unfair and one-sided deal. Wu Xiaohui and Anbang were willing to take a loss because they wanted to gain an advantage, or, as the Chinese saying goes, “Cast a long line to catch a big fish.” Wu Xiaohui had trained his sights not only on the Kushners, but on President Trump, intending to use his connection with the Kushners to influence Trump’s policies on China. (Last December, while awaiting his inauguration as president, Trump broke with convention by having a telephone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. The Chinese government expressed its displeasure to Trump through the connection between Wu Xiaohui and Kushner.)

One time at the end of a negotiation with the elder Kushner, Wu Xiaohui was so ecstatic that he burst out in English to all who were present: “I love you!”

The US media have constantly raised suspicion over the conflict of interests represented by the Trump family’s overseas holdings, and the Kushner family was ultimately compelled to abandon the deal with Anbang. This aborted deal exposed the objectives of overseas investment by Chinese companies: more than mere economic benefit, they also involve Beijing’s political objectives and international strategic arrangements.
In 2014, Anbang purchased New York’s famous Waldorf Hotel for $1.95 billion. This was a hotel that regularly hosted American presidents and foreign heads of state. After Anbang bought the hotel, the American president and most other national leaders no longer patronized it, clearly due to security concerns such as worries about listening devices.

In recent years, Chinese companies have been on a buying spree overseas, especially in Western countries. Chinese companies engaged in overseas buyouts, whether as state-owned companies or as private enterprises, almost all have one thing in common: a connection with the Red elite. For example:

Apart from the Anbang chairman being the grandson-in-law of deceased Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, its former or current shareholders or directors include people like Chen Xiaolu, the son of late PLA Marshal Chen Yi, and Zhu Yunlai, son of former Premier Zhu Rongji.

The chairman of Wanda Group is Wang Jianlin, a member of the “Red second generation” whose father took part in the Communist revolution led by Mao Zedong. Other members of the Red elite who own shares in Wanda include: The elder sister of current Chinese President Xi Jinping, Qi Qiaoqiao, and her husband, Deng Jiagui (they later withdrew their shareholding and re-invested under the name of a functionary); the son of former President Hu Jintao, Hu Haifeng; the daughter of former Premier Wen Jiabao, Wen Ruchun; the son-in-law of former Politburo Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin, Li Botan; and the son of former National People’s Congress standing committee vice-chairman Wang Zhaoguo, Wang Xinning.

The Alibaba Group’s chairman of the board, Jack Ma, comes from a humble family background, but as his company became an internet giant, it pulled in large numbers of the Red elite, with more than 20 family members of current or former Politburo Standing Committee members becoming investors or shareholders.

Like many Chinese billionaires, Anbang chairman Wu Xiaohui makes no attempt to cover up his opportunism, and considers netting the granddaughter of Deng Xiaoping one of his major accomplishment. Wu Xiaohui once openly boasted of his good fortune and shrewdness by saying, “If you choose to stay in the countryside, you’re only going to bump into village girls. But if you go to Paris, you’ll have a chance to see the Mona Lisa.”
The objective of Chinese companies’ massive overseas acquisition drive targeting name-brand companies and high-end enterprises is to buy out the innovative technology of Western countries and transfer the technology and production lines to China, leaving shell companies behind. In Europe, Chinese companies mainly targeted British and then German companies for their buy-outs.

Yet, this acquisition activity is carried out under unequal and unfair conditions: Chinese companies can completely buy out Western companies, but it is impossible for Western companies to completely buy out Chinese companies; shareholdings are usually limited to less than 50 percent, and some Chinese industries don’t allow any foreign investment at all. Especially in the case of government-connected enterprises, Chinese companies can offer to purchase Western companies, but Western companies are not allowed to issue offers to Chinese companies of the same kind.

Western countries have ample reason to worry about the objectives and motivations of Chinese companies in their overseas purchases. Chinese companies seem to intentionally target enterprises or projects related to the technological, economic, political and security lifelines of Western countries. As Western countries have begun to increasingly suspect these motivations, the failure rate of Chinese buyouts has increased, a growing number of acquisitions by Chinese companies run by Wu Xiaohui, Wang Jianlin, Jack Ma and other well-connected entrepreneurs have been obstructed and defeated.

In early 2016, Anbang attempted to acquire the Starwood hotel chain for $14 billion, but the deal fell through when Anbang failed to provide details of its share structure and financing. At the end of 2016, the China Grand Chip Investment Fund attempted to acquire the German semiconductor manufacturer Aixtron, but the German government halted the deal after warnings from US intelligence agencies. Jack Ma’s Ant Financial Services Group made an offer to acquire the American financial services company MoneyGram in 2017, but two members of US Congress have called on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to carry out a thorough investigation, worried that this acquisition might lead to a foreign government controlling a key American financing platform. Negotiations are still ongoing, with rival bidder Kansas-based Euronet also raising security concerns about the Ant Financial deal.

For nearly 20 years, China has made massive investments in Africa, targeting the mineral and energy sectors. Investment in African countries totals tens of billions of dollars every year. The total of $75 billion invested from 2000 to 2011 is seven times the amount that Japan invested during that same period. One million Chinese are currently active in Africa. China’s trade with Africa reached $149.1 billion in 2016 (including $92.2 billion in Chinese exports to Africa, and $56.9 billion in imports from Africa to China, creating a trade deficit of more than $35 billion for African countries). As China-Africa trade has grown, Africans’ antipathy toward the Chinese has likewise increased.
Africans complain that Chinese companies pay low wages under poor working conditions, that their products are inferior, that their construction is shoddy and detrimental to the environment. China’s mining activities in Africa regularly meet with protest from local people, and Chinese companies often experience violent clashes with local workers. Africans compare the Chinese to parasites rather than investors.

China invests in Africa ostensibly with “no conditions attached,” but the World Bank and other international organizations have pointed out that Beijing’s methods offset the international community’s efforts to use trade to promote political reform and to use economic aid in exchange for human rights. China turns a blind eye to corruption, abuse of power and trampling on human rights by African governments, and even extends its own corrupt and dictatorial “China Model” to Africa in its attempts to “Sinicize” Africa.

While claiming “no conditions attached,” China attaches alternative conditions to its investment in Africa: The profits that African countries gain through Chinese investment have to be spent on infrastructure built by China and on products imported from China. At the same time that Chinese companies invest in Africa, they continually purchase raw materials from China and hire Chinese workers, increasingly excluding local people. This makes China’s aid to Africa more like a pillage of Africa, and has led with China being referred to as “neo-colonialist.”

What former Zambian President Michael Sata said while campaigning for office in 2007 is typical of this sentiment. Describing Chinese investment as “a dumping ground for their human beings,” Sata said, “We want the Chinese to leave and the old colonial rulers to return. They exploited our natural resources too, but at least they took good care of us. They built schools, taught us their language and brought us the British civilization. At least Western capitalism has a human face; the Chinese are only out to exploit us.”

Starting in 2010, an increasing number of countries such as Zambia, Angola, Gabon and Chad have been saying no to China by refusing new cooperation, halting existing cooperation and taking back development projects. It is clear that China has become unwelcome in Africa.

Last month New York Times posted an editorial: China Wants Fish, So Africa Goes Hungry. According to this article, with China’s own waters heavily overfished, the Chinese government supports its fishermen sailing farther to exploit the waters of other countries, pushing the fish stocks to the brink of collapse. The Chinese government commands a fleet of 2,600 vessels, 10 times larger than the United States fleet, all heavily subsidized. The Chinese government is concerned with its domestic needs and regime security much more than the health of the world’s oceans and the countries that depend on them.

As its wealth increased, the Chinese government took the lead in establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but the world’s first and third largest economies, the US and Japan, have not joined the bank. Japan at one point asked the Chinese side: How will you avoid corruption in the AIIB? And how will you avoid the risk of debt default? The Chinese side did not respond. This is one reason why Japan hasn’t joined AIIB. (Of course, another aspect is that the Chinese-led AIIB is intended to serve as a rival to the Japanese-led Asian Development Bank.)

Corresponding to the AIIB is Beijing’s extremely ambitious “One Belt One Road” strategy (which was recently changed in English to “Belt and Road”), which extends China’s maritime and overland trading routes to every part of the world.

European countries refused to sign the trade statement at the Silk Road summit held in Beijing last month. European countries complained  that the statement did not address European concerns surrounding transparency of public procurement and social and environmental standards.

The term One Belt One Road supposedly mirrors the Silk Road concept China employed in the seventh century, but at that time the Silk Road was an international trading corridor spontaneously formed by private citizens. The so-called New Silk Road is permeated with the Chinese government’s two key political and economic objectives: The first is to carry out Chinese-style hegemonism by controlling countries along the belt or road through the pretext of economic aid and economic development, and using this opportunity to establish an international economic network with China at its center. The second is to shift China’s excess production capacity overseas, and transfer the crisis and risk of China’s economic recession.

The first project of One Belt One Road was the construction of a large hydroelectric plant in Pakistan to facilitate the development of the so-called “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”. Beijing’s motives were all too obvious: Pakistan is just about China’s only allied country besides North Korea. Beijing was sending the signal that it would prioritize investment in countries that followed Beijing’s orders. In other words, countries that do not obey Beijing’s orders would not enjoy such benefits.

In the South China Sea, Beijing claims that 80% of this maritime region belongs to China, and China’s so-called territorial boundary (the nine-dash line) encircles the entrances to Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries, not even allowing for the exclusive economic zones of neighboring countries. Beijing may rationalize this because the name of the South China Sea includes the word China, but according to that logic, Mexico can claim 80% of the Gulf of Mexico, and India can claim 80% of the Indian Ocean. (Last year, the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected China’s claims of sovereignty within the nine-dash line.)

China has occupied Scarborough Shoal (also known as Huangyan Island) and some other islands in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, in violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to which China is a signatory. According to this convention, Beijing acknowledges that each country has an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles. China has also built seven artificial islands with military installations in the South China Sea in violation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which China adopted with ASEAN nations in 2002. In this declaration, Beijing acknowledges that no one party can take unilateral action to change the existing conditions in the South China Sea.

China, although a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has long ignored UN resolutions on North Korea’s nuclear threat; even sanctions that China took part in drafting and voted to support have not affected China’s trade with North Korea. Last Year, North Korea carried out two nuclear bomb tests, but China’s trade and aid to North Koreas actually increased rather than decreased. Chinese companies such as Hongxiang Industrial have been providing nuclear components and materials to North Korea for years, implying Chinese support of Pyongyang’s nuclear aspirations. It wasn’t until the beginning of this year, under enormous pressure to rescue imperiled Sino-American relations under the Trump administration, that the Xi Jinping government began implementing UN resolutions by temporarily halting coal imports from  North Korea. Xi has recently tacitly agreed to Trump taking a harder line against Kim Jong-un.

Speaking of economic development, Chinese officials often proudly show off: "China only took more than thirty years to walk through the Western countries for hundreds of years." But how did this come about? Plagiarism, cyberattacks, large-scale pirating of intellectual property rights. This is not only Chinese individuals or enterprises’ behaviors, but more so the Chinese government and the Chinese Army’s behaviors.

In summary, as the world’s second-largest economy and newest superpower, China’s overseas impact is growing by the day. However, its methods, processes, and results all show that, generally, China’s overseas impact is not constructive, but rather destructive; and that China is not contributing to world peace, but rather introducing danger and risk to the world.

If the house welcomes China’s impact overseas, should be a democratic China’s impact overseas. I believe that only a democratic China can bring benefit and peach to the world.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much!

June 1, 2017, at Oxford Union
University of Oxford

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